COMMON WORSHIP
Joshua Cockayne and David Efird

People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they
do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal
preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this
paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent
work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables a person to come to know God
better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship.

Introduction1
In the past fifty years, philosophers of religion have spent a great amount
of time considering questions that relate to the epistemology of religious
belief, in particular, to whether such belief is rational, justified, warranted,
or, in some other way, epistemically permissible. These are just some of
the questions that have generated thousands of pages of journal articles,
books, and conference papers. However, if we look at the issues of religious belief “on the street” (to borrow a phrase from Mark Wynn),2 these
are, perhaps, not the questions that occupy the minds of religious believers
most of the time, for a commitment to religious belief, at least for many, is
more than a commitment to believing certain doctrines or creeds; rather,
it is a commitment to a way of life, a way of life typically characterized by
attending corporate worship.
For many religious believers, they will spend thousands of hours in
their lifetime singing hymns, listening to and saying prayers, and listening
to sermons and homilies with other people. What is the point of spending
all this time with all these people engaging in all this worship? We expect
1
We borrow the title from the name given to the series of services authorised for use in
the Church of England, Common Worship, a liturgical alternative to the Book of Common Prayer.
In this article, we attempt to give a broad account of liturgical worship, but, for the simple
reason of familiarity, our discussion is primarily informed by the practice in the Church of
England.
2
Wynn, Renewing the Senses, 12.
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we are not the first to ask this question, especially when we think of teenagers across the world being cajoled into going to church by their parents
on Sunday mornings, or those who prefer worshipping on their own, by
using some kind of liturgy, or by taking a walk on their own through a
particularly beautiful part of nature and contemplating the goodness of
God.
While there has been significant work recently on the philosophy of
liturgical worship,3 this work does not adequately address the point, or
the value, of corporate worship, as above, beyond, or just different from,
individual worship.4 In this paper, we attempt to fill this lacuna. There
are many answers that could be given which seek to explain the value
of corporate worship. For instance, according to J. B. Torrance, corporate
worship allows us to become “truly human” by expressing ourselves in
relation God and to our fellow human,5 or, as Stanley Hauerwas contends,
corporate worship provides a “foretaste of the unity of the communion
of the saints.”6 Whilst it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to give a
definitive answer to this question, we suggest that one such value of corporate worship is a kind of epistemic value. That is, we argue, one way in
which corporate worship is better than individual worship is that it gives
us the opportunity to know God better than we would otherwise know
him in individual worship.7
To argue for this conclusion, we begin by reviewing Eleonore Stump’s
account of what it is to come to know a person and Bonnie M. Talbert’s
account of what it is to come to know a person well.8 After explaining
Talbert’s criteria for what it is to come to know a person well, we aim to
show that worshipping God is an opportunity to fulfil the first of Talbert’s
Nicholas Wolterstorff, The God We Worship; Terence Cuneo, Ritualized Faith.
Both Wolterstorff and Cuneo frame their discussions of liturgy in a corporate setting. For
instance, Wolterstorff writes the following:
The church enacts the liturgy not to satisfy the needs and desires of individual
congregants but to worship God. The church blesses God, praises God, thanks
God, confesses her sins to God, petitions God, listens to God’s Word, celebrates the
Eucharist. It is not the individual members who do these things simultaneously; it
is the established body that does these things. (Wolterstorff, The God We Worship,
11)
Additionally, Cuneo provides an account of collective singing in liturgy in which individuals jointly-intend to sing the liturgical script (Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 135–140). Yet, what is
lacking from this literature is a detailed account of why this setting makes any difference to
the epistemology of liturgy.
5
Torrance, Worship, 28.
6
Hauerwas, In Good Company, 157.
7
While this kind of corporate knowledge of God may be available through other corporate
spiritual practices, such as group Bible study or group prayer meetings, we are concerned,
in this paper, solely with the spiritual practice of worship and arguing that corporate worship has a particular epistemic value over individual worship that has not been sufficiently
appreciated yet in the philosophical literature on liturgy. That is, we hold that knowing God
through corporate worship is a species of the genus of knowing God corporately.
8
Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 64–83; Talbert, “Knowing Other People.”
3
4
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criteria for knowing a person well, and worshipping God corporately is an
opportunity to fulfil, in part, Talbert’s other criteria for knowing a person
well, though they cannot be completely fulfilled, as we note.
We argue that liturgical worship is a way to come to know God by
adapting recent work on experiencing God second-personally in reading
Scripture and celebrating the Eucharist.9 In this way, we argue, worship
provides a believer with a mode of, and an occasion for, a second-personal experience of God, so that, in worship, the believer comes to know
God second-personally. This is the first of Talbert’s criteria for knowing a
person well. We then extend this epistemology of worship to account for
the value of corporate worship, as a way of coming to know God better
than we would otherwise know him in individual worship. Inspired by C.
S. Lewis’s discussion of friendship in The Four Loves, according to which
others bring out aspects of a friend that we could not bring out ourselves,
we argue that, in taking part in corporate worship, a person can engage
not only with God, as they experience him, but also with other members’
engagement with God, that is, how they experience him, thereby bringing
out aspects of God that they would not be able to experience themselves.
And we then conclude by applying the work of Axel Seemann and John
Campbell on mutual perception to argue that corporate worship enables
our worship to be shaped by others,10 thereby providing an opportunity
to broaden our knowledge of God and remove any ingrained biases we
may have.11
Knowing God and Knowing Him Better Than We Do Now
Just as, for the last fifty years, religious epistemology has been dominated
by the problems of, and prospects for, the rationality, justification, warrantedness, and so on, of religious belief, for the last fifty years, analytic
epistemology has been dominated by the problems of, and prospects
for, propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge that, such as that Paula
knows that Jerome is her friend. Our project concerns something different. It is not concerned with knowing that God exists, but, rather, with
knowing God, and more, how we might come to know him better than
we do now. We begin our account of what it is to know God well with
Eleonore Stump’s account of what is required to know a person.
In her magisterial Wandering in Darkness, Stump gives an account of a
certain kind of knowledge which is irreducible to propositional knowledge. This kind of knowledge she calls “Franciscan knowledge” in contrast
to “Dominican knowledge,” which is either propositional knowledge or
reducible to propositional knowledge. Examples of Franciscan knowledge
9
Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions”; Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the
Real Presence of Christ.” Here we adopt the view that all who participate in the Eucharist,
both the congregation and the president, are celebrants of the Eucharist: “Holy Communion
is celebrated by the whole people of God gathered for worship” (Common Worship, 158).
10
Seemann, “Joint Attention”; Campbell, “Joint Attention.”
11
These conditions concern Talbert’s remaining criteria for knowing a person well.
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include what we might call “narrative knowledge,” that is, the knowledge
you gain from reading a work of great literature. Part of what makes the
work a great work of literature is that you learn something, something
about yourself or the world, and this “something” you just cannot put into
words. In a slogan—you have learned something that goes beyond what
you can say.
Another example of Franciscan knowledge, according to Stump, is phenomenal knowledge, that is, the knowledge of what-it-is-like-ness, such
as what it is like to see a red tomato, to feel the pang of jealousy, to taste
the bitterness of a lemon, and so forth. She thinks this phenomenal knowledge is irreducible to propositional knowledge because of Frank Jackson’s
thought experiment about Mary,12 the super-smart colour scientist, who
knows all the propositional information there is to know about red but
has never seen the colour, having lived all her days in a black and white
room; one day, she is released from her room and sees, say, a red tomato,
and Stump takes it that she has learned something new upon seeing the
red tomato. This new piece of knowledge can be neither propositional
knowledge nor reducible to propositional knowledge, since she had all
that knowledge prior to her release. It must, rather, be Franciscan knowledge, or so Stump maintains.
Innovatively extending Jackson’s thought experiment, Stump gives a
third example of Franciscan knowledge, namely, personal knowledge, a
kind of knowledge that begins with a second-personal experience. On her
version of the thought experiment, Mary is brought up in a room in which
she has access to only third-personal propositional information about the
world. What would Mary learn, Stump asks, when she encounters her
mother for the first time, for example? And what does this tell us about
what she lacks from her third-person perspective? According to Stump,
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary
will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything
about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative propositional form, including her mother’s psychological states. Although Mary
knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with
her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. . . . [W]hat will come
as the major revelation to Mary is her mother. . . . What is new for Mary is a
second-person experience.13

Just as Mary gained phenomenal knowledge in seeing a red tomato, so
Mary gains personal knowledge on meeting her mother, both being Franciscan knowledge. What occasions this personal knowledge for Mary is
her second-personal experience with her mother.
Generalizing from this thought experiment, Stump claims that Paula
has a second-person experience of Jerome only if

12
13

Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia.”
Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 52–53.
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(1) Paula is aware of Jerome as a person (call the relation Paula has to Jerome in this condition “personal interaction”),
(2) Paula’s personal interaction with Jerome is of a direct and immediate
sort, and
(3) Jerome is conscious,14

and it is this kind of experience that is required for Paula to come to know
Jerome, that is, for Paula to come to have personal knowledge of Jerome.
Now, it should be noted, at this point, that Paula’s having a second-personal experience of Jerome is necessary, but not sufficient for,
knowing Jerome. For all that is required for a second-personal experience
is a kind of awareness, and awareness is insufficient for personal knowledge because awareness need not involve what Stump calls “significant
personal presence,” which, Stump takes it, personal knowledge requires.15
Say that you sit next to someone on the bus. You are aware of them, and
you interact with them directly and immediately, and the person is conscious (it is not a late-night bus), and so you are having a second-person
experience of them, but you do not know them because, even though you
are both present, you are not present to one another (as in, “We had dinner
together, but she was not present to me, as she was on her phone all evening.”) To be present to another person, you have to attend to them, and
this is what needs to be added to second-personal experience to produce
personal knowledge. In other words, for Paula to come to know Jerome,
not only must she be aware of Jerome, but also, she must attend to him,
and him to her. This kind of mutual attending psychologists call “joint
attention.” More specifically, for Paula to come to know Jerome she must
engage in dyadic joint attention with him, where dyadic joint attention
consists in Paula and Jerome attending to one another. (Triadic joint attention, which we will discuss later, consists in Paula and Jerome attending
to a third object while they attend to one another.) The reason dyadic joint
attention is required for personal knowledge is that it is only in the context
of joint attention that Paula can reveal herself to Jerome and Jerome can
accurately perceive what Paula has revealed to him. So, personal knowledge not only requires second-personal experience but also dyadic joint
attention.
Now, it is important to note that personal knowledge comes in degrees. You can know one person better than you know another, and you
can come to know a person better as you experience more of them in
more contexts and environments. This is something Bonnie M. Talbert’s
analysis of personal knowledge emphasizes.16 One way to examine this
phenomenon, of knowing someone better, is by considering the end-point
of coming to know them better, that is, of what it is to know them well.
Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 75–76.
Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 110.
16
Talbert, “Knowing Other People.”
14
15

304

Faith and Philosophy

Knowing someone well, as Talbert describes it, “is normally the product
of a sequence of interactions” that have, minimally, the following features:
(1) We have had a significant number of second-person face-to-face interactions with A, at least some of which have been relatively recent.
(2) The contexts of those interactions were such as to permit A to reveal
important aspects of her/himself, and A has done so.
(3) A has not deceived us about him/herself in important respects.
(4) We have succeeded in accurately perceiving what A has revealed—i.e.
[our judgement is not impaired] by [our] own biases.17

These conditions, as Talbert describes them, help us to “map out features
of interactions ordinarily necessary to ground claims to know someone
well.”18
Do Talbert’s conditions apply to the context of knowing God well? If
God is a person, and Talbert has correctly identified the conditions for
knowing a person, then we might assume so. But God is a special person.
And part of what makes him special seems to make it hard for us to know
him, let alone know him well, in this life.19 To begin, we cannot see God
face-to-face, not only because he is incorporeal, but also because, as God
said to Moses, “you cannot see my face; for no one shall see me and live”
(Exodus 33:20). Yet, Talbert stresses that face-to-face interaction plays an
important role in second-personal knowledge. She writes,
In face-to-face interaction, we can see, hear, and smell the same things at the
same time. The possibilities for joint attention (where two people are paying
attention to the same thing, and each is aware of the other’s attention) make
it possible that not only are we both looking at the same tree, I know you see
the tree and you know that I see it, and we both know that we both see the
tree. In short, we can jointly attend to objects in our shared environment.20

Now, Talbert is undoubtedly correct in stating that face-to-face interaction makes it easier to engage with a person second-personally, but, as
we will see in the next section, by considering recent work on sharing
attention with God, it is at least possible to engage in joint attention with a
person without seeing them face-to-face.21 Thus, we might think, the condition might be weakened in the following way:
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 194.
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 196.
19
Perhaps we can know God well in the life to come (cf. 1 Corinthians 13.12).
20
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 193.
21
The best way of defending this condition, we think, assumes that God is omnipresent
in the way defined by Stump (Wandering in Darkness, 117). For Stump, God’s omnipresence
consists, in part, in his being available for significant personal presence, which includes
second-personal experience and dyadic joint attention, always and everywhere, and so in
(places of) worship. Thus, rather than thinking of God as fundamentally located at all places,
Stump thinks God’s omnipresence requires that he be derivatively located at all places by
means of his always willing to share attention with us. It might be objected, as an anonymous
17
18
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(1*) We have had had a significant number of second-person interactions with A, at least some of which have been relatively recent.
However, this revised condition is still problematic in the context of
knowing God since there appear to be obvious counter-examples: first,
someone who knows God well on the first meeting, and secondly, someone
who knows God well despite not interacting with him second-personally
for a long time.
To begin, it might be thought that someone could experience God for
the first time in a significant self-revelation of God, and in that one experience know him well. But this is not possible, at least in this life.22 For we
could come to know God well in one significant self-revelation in this life
only if we would know how to understand such a self-revelation. And
we would know how to understand such a self-revelation only if we had
experienced similar self-revelations of other people very much like God
previously, perhaps in increasingly more significant self-revelations. But
God is very much unlike people we have come to know, even come to
know well. And so, such a self-revelation of God would be discontinuous
reviewer has, that this assumption (that God is available for significant present to us always
and everywhere) simply denies the phenomenon of divine hiddenness. As a divine phenomenon, that is, of God hiding himself from us, yes, we do deny that God does that, but, as a
human phenomenon, of us, most of the time and in most places, being unable, because we
are distracted, and unwilling, because we are disinterested, to be significantly present to God
ourselves, we affirm it. As Stump writes,
Given divine omnipresence, the only thing that makes a difference to the kind of
personal presence, significant or minimal, that God has to a human person is the
condition of the human person herself. If Paula wants Jerome to be significantly
present to her, she alone will not be able to bring about what she wants, because
the relationship she wants is up to Jerome as much as it is up to her, and, for one
reason or another, Jerome may fail to meet the conditions requisite for significant personal presence. But, on the doctrine of omnipresence, things are different
when it comes to God’s being significantly present to a human person. If Paula
wants God to be significantly present to her, what is needed to bring about what
she wants depends only on her, on her being able and willing to share attention
with God. Because God is omnipresent, then, if Paula is able and willing to share
attention with God, the presence omnipresent God has to her will be significant
personal presence. If she is not able and willing, then God will have only minimal
personal presence with respect to her. (Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 117)
This approach to the problem of “divine hiddenness,” as it is known, is broadly in the
tradition of St John of the Cross. As Sarah Coakley explains John’s perspective on this phenomenon,
The appearance of divine “hiddenness” is the effect of a human epistemological and
moral condition, not an ontological state of affairs that bespeaks any divine failure
to communicate or self-disclose, let alone to effect an intentional withdrawal or
abandonment. (Coakley, “Divine Hiddenness,” 231)
We return to this theme of “divine hiddenness,” or, on our account, “human distractedness
and disinterestedness,” toward the end of the paper, when we discuss the importance of
co-perceivers for better perception of what God has revealed of himself to us.
22
It may be that a person could know God well in one significant self-revelation of God in
the life to come, particularly in the beatific vision. We leave for another occasion the exploration of this possibility, as we are concerned in this paper with the value of corporate worship
in this life and not in the life to come.
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with our previous experiences of self-revelations of other people. Thus, it
would not be possible for us to understand a significant self-revelation of
God sufficient to come to know him well. Indeed, such a self-revelation
might be painful for us, as it was to St John of the Cross.23 Consequently,
we cannot, at least in this life, come to know God well in one significant
self-revelation, and so we cannot remove the requirement that we have
had a significant number of second-person interactions with God in order
to know him well.
But what about the “recency” element? Must some of those second-person interactions with God be recent if we are to know him well?
Consider the case of Mother Teresa, who, for the last forty years of her
life reported experiencing a dark night of the soul in which God felt distant or even absent from her. Could such a person know God or know
God well?24 Surely, if anybody is a candidate for knowing God well, or
relatively well, in this life, then someone like Mother Teresa would be a
suitable candidate. So how do we deal with cases such as hers?
There seems to be two motivations behind the recency condition. The
first has to do with people changing over time. If we have not seen a person
over a number of years, it is plausible that we do not know them as well as
we used to, or even at all, because what made them the person we knew
has changed so much: Their beliefs, their desires, their values, their goals,
and all the rest may be quite different from what they were when we spent
time with them. In such a case, we might say that we used to know them,
but we do not anymore. The second motivation has to do with our memories, that memories of experiences of other people can become forgotten
or distorted over the passage of time. If we knew a person a number of
years ago, even if they have not changed much at all, we might no longer
know them as well, or even at all, if we have forgotten our experiences
with them or our memories of them are wildly inaccurate.
With these two motivations in mind, let us think about Mother Teresa
and God. For many years, she had not had a second-personal experience
of God. Yet, even after this time, she still knew him as well as anyone ever
did in this life, or so it seems to us. The first motivation for the recency
condition, that people change, does not seem to apply to God, or at least
not as much as it does to human beings. While it is contentious whether
God changes at all, it is relatively uncontroversial that he does not change
fundamentally. That is, the beliefs, desires, values, and goals God has
do not change, or do not change much. So, the first motivation does not
seem to apply to this case. But what about the second? Mother Teresa is a
human being subject to the cognitive limitations we all have to deal with.
In particular, her memory, no doubt, was imperfect. But her memories
of her experiences of God had to be present and true, for how else could
she have done the work she did with the poor of Calcutta? We find it
23
24

Cf. Coakley, “Divine Hiddenness.”
With thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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unlikely that she had forgotten her experiences of God or her memories
of these experiences were distorted by time. So, while there is still reason,
deriving from the second motivation, to include the “recency” condition
in the analysis, we can add a caveat which will allow Mother Teresa to still
know God well despite the many years in which she did not experience
him second-personally:
(1**) We have had had a significant number of second-person interactions with A, at least some of which have been relatively recent,
unless we have a significant body of memories of second-person
interactions with A which have not been distorted.
A further problem when applying Talbert’s conditions to the case of
knowing God is that we cannot perceive God accurately in this life; God
is too great, and our intellects are too weak.25 This appears to put pressure on the application of conditions (2)–(4) in knowing God. But, just as
knowledge of a person comes in degrees, so does accuracy of perception
of a person. That is, just as we can know a person better, so we can perceive what they reveal to us of themselves better. And the latter leads to
the former. Even though, in this life, we cannot see God face-to-face, and
we cannot perceive what he reveals to us of himself entirely accurately, we
can nevertheless come to know him, specifically in worship. Furthermore,
we argue, corporate worship provides us with an opportunity to come to
know God better (than we would otherwise know him in individual worship) because (i) corporate worship gives God an opportunity to reveal
aspects of himself he could not as easily reveal in individual worship, and
(ii) corporate worship helps us to perceive what God has revealed to us of
himself better (than we would otherwise perceive in individual worship)
by removing biases and other impairments that alter our judgment or perception. Thus, even if we cannot know God well, since we can know God
better, we see no need to amend conditions (2)–(4).
We propose, then, the following adapted version of Talbert’s analysis.
Paula knows God well when
(1) Paula has had a significant number of second-person interactions
with God, at least some of which have been relatively recent, unless
she has a significant body of memories of second-person interactions with God which have not been distorted.
(2) The contexts of those interactions were such as to permit God to
reveal important aspects of himself, and God has done so.
(3) God has not deceived Paula about himself in important respects.
(4) Paula has succeeded in accurately perceiving what God has revealed—i.e., Paula’s judgement is not impaired by her own biases.
25
Following Aquinas, we take it that we will be able to perceive God accurately in the life
to come when God grants us this knowledge by joining our intellects (Summa Theologica, 1a
12.4.co).
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To consider what epistemic value corporate worship might provide,
let us now consider the application of these conditions in the context of
corporate worship.
Liturgical Worship as an Opportunity to Have
Second-personal Interactions with God
To begin, liturgical worship helps us to come to know God better by
providing us with opportunities to have a significant number of second-personal experiences of God, thereby fulfilling Talbert’s first condition
of knowing a person well, as applied to our knowing God. To explain
how corporate worship is able to do this, we first outline Adam Green
and Keith A. Quan’s discussion of experiencing God through Scripture,26
before considering its application to the case of corporate worship.
Building on Stump’s work on experiencing God second-personally,
Green and Quan argue that reading Scripture can give us a kind of interpersonal knowledge of God by allowing us to share attention with God. In
giving an account of sharing attention with God through Scripture, Green
and Quan attempt to explain the theological claim that God is present in,
and speaks through, the pages of Scripture. They argue that, in reading
Scripture, a person can engage in “cooperative activity with the divine
in which God uses the text of the Scriptures to reveal Himself dyadically
or triadically.”27 That is, the text not only prompts the individual to the
possibility of God’s presence, but also, it provides the means of experiencing God’s presence. They use the following example to highlight the
possibility of sharing attention through text:
Alex wins a private cooking lesson with Rachael Ray. He is deaf, so Rachael
communicates with him using written notes. At a certain point in the lesson,
she hands him a note that reads, “Consider the golden-brown crust of this
zucchini bake,” at which point he attends with Rachael to the crust. He looks
back at Rachael who smiles and holds out a note between them that reads,
“You done good.”28

They claim that, “just as Ray hands Alex a note saying he ‘done good’
[which] shapes how Alex experiences Ray’s kindly smile, so God might
elect for the contents of Scripture to shape a dyadic experience of the
divine.”29 What we come to know from reading Scripture, if Green and
Quan are right, is not some claim about God, but, rather, we come to know
God, that is, we come to know him personally.
There is no reason why this account cannot be extended beyond the discussion of Scripture. Straightforwardly, any spiritual practice which uses
text would allow for attention sharing in the way that Green and Quan
Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions.”
Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions,” 427.
28
Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions,” 422.
29
Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions,” 426.
26
27
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describe. Thus, the use of a liturgical script could allow a person to share
attention with God in the way described by Green and Quan. However,
we know that liturgy involves not only the reciting of certain words, but
also the performing of certain actions. As Cuneo notes, liturgical practice
involves certain act-types such as “entering a space of worship, singing,
bowing, listening, eating, and the like”30 as well as the reciting of a script.
Consequently, the performance of certain actions can also provide the kind
of attention sharing Green and Quan claim is possible with texts. As we
have argued elsewhere, in our discussion of experiencing the real presence
of Christ in the Eucharist,31 Green and Quan’s analysis can also be extended
to the use of certain ritual actions. We provide the following application of
Green and Quan’s thought experiment to illustrate this possibility:
Alex and Rachael have been married for fifty years. On their first date, Alex
cooked Rachael a steak with peppercorn sauce and green beans. Recently,
they have been having difficulties in their marriage, but decide to devote
the evening to spend together. Alex comes in the room, looks at Rachael,
and presents her with a plate of steak with peppercorn sauce and green
beans. Rachael looks back at Alex, without saying anything and smiles at
him, whilst placing her hand over her ring finger.32

In such a case, objects, events, and rituals can play an important role in
attention sharing experiences.33 If this is so, there is an obvious extension
to be made to the experience of taking part in the Eucharist. The Eucharist, thought of as a kind of reconciliation meal, can play a similar role in
the reconciliation between Christ and a person as it can between Rachael
and Alex. The elements provide an object for mutual attention sharing
between Christ and the person and, consequently, for shared attention.34
Thus, in experiencing God second-personally by reading Scripture, or
by sharing attention with God by engaging with liturgical worship, it is
possible for a person to meet the minimal requirements for knowing God
personally, namely, experiencing him second-personally and dyadically
sharing attention with him, as discussed in Stump’s account of knowing
a person.
Moreover, we think, not only can such experiences of shared attention
meet the minimal conditions for knowing God, but also, they can improve
a person’s knowledge of God. Recall that our modification of Talbert’s first
condition required that to know God, a person must have a significant
number of second-personal interactions with God. By focusing only on
Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 10.
Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ.”
32
Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ,” 17.
33
Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ,” 17.
34
This account of coming to know God second-personally has also been extended to nonverbal- or non-text-based practices too. David Efird and Daniel Gustafson (“Experiencing
Christian Art”), for instance, have argued that Christian art can allow for second-personal
experience of God.
30
31
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this first condition, we can see that the number of second-personal interactions, more often than not, brings about an improvement in personal
knowledge (though we will see in the proceeding sections that the content
and breadth of these experiences is also important for an improvement in
personal knowledge). In general, the more times we engage with a person
second-personally, the more chances we have to get to know them better.
The same is also true of God, we think. Indeed, this might go some way
to explaining the importance of repetition in the use of spiritual practices.
One of the reasons that the frequency of experiences of shared attention
improves our knowledge of another person, as Talbert explains it, is that
these experiences can allow us to gain a certain kind of practical knowledge, that is, a knowledge of how to interact with them. She writes the
following:
To know another is to know how to successfully interact with him/her over
time. Knowing how to interact with a particular person starts with the largely ineffable ability to recognize him/her, which recognition comes to be associated with a more complex mental representation of that individual. . . .
Our interactive skills are largely intuitive and difficult to express in propositional terms. For example, when I am talking to Shannon, I find that I pace
my remarks differently than I do when I am talking to Deme. Without thinking about it I seem to adjust the pace of my conversation to what I somehow
perceive is most suitable to the interaction.35

Now, Talbert’s analysis of practical knowledge and personal knowledge
has an important application to the use of corporate liturgical worship. As
Cuneo has argued, “Knowing God consists in (although is not exhausted
by) knowing how to engage God,”36 where knowing how to engage God
consists in knowing a way of acting. A way of acting is “a sequence of
act-types that an agent can perform.”37 The actions of singing, chanting,
prostrating, and eating, for instance, can “count in the context of a liturgical performance as cases of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God.”38
Thus, he argues, “If this is correct, the liturgy provides the materials for
not only engaging but also knowing how to engage God.”39
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 196–197.
Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 149.
37
Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 151.
38
Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163.
39
Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163. Nicholas Wolterstorff, in “Knowing God Liturgically,”
agrees with him that the knowledge gained in liturgy is objectual knowledge, and the object
is not a proposition, but whereas on Cuneo’s account, the object is a way of acting, on Wolterstorff’s account, the object is a person, namely, God, and the knowledge gained in liturgy
is knowledge of what God is like. According to Wolterstorff, in the use of liturgy, we address
God as being a certain way, for instance, that is he is worthy of praise and adoration. The
repetition of our addressing God in this way, allows us to gain a knowledge of what God is
like. Wolterstorff writes the following:
To participate in engaging God liturgically in the form of addressing God is to take
God to be a “thou” whom it is appropriate to address, to take God to be capable of
listening, to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration, to take God to be ca35
36
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Following the work of Green and Quan, Cuneo, as well as our earlier
work on the Eucharist, we can see that sharing attention with God by
singing hymns, saying prayers, or participating in the Eucharist can contribute to a person’s second-personal knowledge of God.40 Now, for most
worshippers, these activities take place corporately, in gathered services
involving some sort of leader and one or more congregants. However,
much of what we have argued so far could be applied equally to individual and corporate worship, for many cases of reading Scripture alone
or saying the daily office could allow a person to experience God second-personally. The ways in which corporate worship provides improves
upon a person’s knowledge of God in ways that an individual cannot are
yet to be specified. And that is what we turn to now.
Corporate Worship as an Opportunity for God to Reveal Aspects of Himself
Let us consider our second condition in the context of corporate worship.
Our claim is that corporate worship provides a context for interactions with
God which permit him to reveal more aspects of himself than he would
otherwise have an opportunity to do in individual worship. To argue for
this, we begin by considering a point made by C. S. Lewis, namely, that
different friends bring out different aspects of a mutual friend, to argue
that different worshippers, that is, different friends of God, bring out different aspects of God in the shared world of corporate worship, so that
each worshipper gets to experience more aspects of God than they would
otherwise experience if they were worshipping alone.
For Lewis, an important part of a person’s friendship with other people
is their experience of them communally. He imagines the following scenario:
If, of three friends (A, B, and C), A should die, then B loses not only A but
“A’s part in C,” while C loses not only A but “A’s part in B.” In each of my
friends there is something that only some other friend can fully bring out. By
myself I am not large enough to call the whole man into activity; I want other lights than my own to show all his facets. Now that Charles is dead, I shall
never again see Ronald’s reaction to a specifically Charles joke. Far from
having more of Ronald, having him “to myself” now that Charles is away, I
have less of Ronald. Hence true Friendship is the least jealous of loves. Two
friends delight to be joined by a third, and three by a fourth, if only the newcomer is qualified to become a real friend. They can say, as the blessed souls
say in Dante, “Here comes one who will augment our loves.” For in this love
“to divide is not to take away.” Of course, the scarcity of kindred souls—not
pable of listening, to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration. (Wolterstorff,
“Knowing God Liturgically,” 13)
Wolterstorff sees his position as complementing the insights of both Stump and Cuneo in
explaining how person knowledge can be involved in liturgical practice.
40
Of course, there may other benefits of shared attention experiences other than personal
knowledge. As we state in the opening section, our focus here is on the epistemic value of
corporate worship in allowing us to know God better. For this reason, we only consider the
role of shared attention in allowing us to know God personally.
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to mention practical considerations about the size of rooms and the audibility of voices—set limits to the enlargement of the circle, but within those
limits we possess each friend not less but more as the number of those with
whom we share him increases.41

Lewis’s point seems to be right. We know from experience that most of our
friendships are interdependent on other friendships and relationships. As
social creatures, our experience, and subsequent knowledge of persons, is
interwoven into specific contexts and environments, as well as into wider
relationships. We know that different of our friends bring out different
aspects of our personality, including some aspects we thought we had
long ago left behind, such as when old school friends make us regress
into acting like immature teenagers. So, when you are with a friend, and
you meet other of their friends you have not met before, you can come
to see a different side to them you have not seen before; imagine tagging
along with them as they met their old school friends. One of the values of
having such an experience of your friend is that in seeing them act like an
immature teenager, you come to know them better, namely, by revealing
more of that person to you and so being able to share more of their world
with them. Consequently, following Talbert’s account of what it is to know
a person well, it seems reasonable to think that the more we encounter a
person with other of their friends the more opportunities we have to come
to know them better.
By drawing on Talbert’s work, as well as literature on the shared attention, we think that there are at least two ways of construing Lewis’s point
in more specific terms. The most natural reading of Lewis’s point concerns
the objects of our experience—by sharing attention with a person in a
broader social sphere, we are able to experience more of that person as the
object of our attention. We consider this interpretation of Lewis’s thought
first, in this section. After this, in the next section, we consider another
aspect of Lewis’s thought, although, admittedly this second reading is less
obviously Lewis’s concern. As we will show, one way of understanding
the effects of experiencing a friend in broader social spheres is that we
are able to allow others to shape our attention in ways which allow us to
perceive other aspects of our friend, previously unavailable to us.
Let us first consider how social experiences can broaden and deepen
our perception of the object of our experience. As we have seen, amongst
Talbert’s concerns for knowing a person well is something similar to this
first reading of Lewis’s thought—that to know a person well, we must
have a deep and broad experience of that person in different contexts and
environments. Talbert argues that to ground our personal knowledge of
another person and, thereby, allow them to reveal important aspects of
themselves, we must have a certain shared experience, or shared world,
with that person. She writes,

41

Lewis, The Four Loves, 73–74.
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Many of the factors determining the reliability of our knowledge of other
people have to do with the extent of our shared worlds. We can talk about
shared worlds in two senses: the wide and the narrow. In the wide sense, typical humans share a tremendous amount of background information about
their worlds that arises out of their shared physiologies, cultural membership, and other sources. . . . In the narrow sense, two or more individuals can
be said to have shared worlds to the extent of their shared experiences—e.g.
similar memories of past episodes of joint attention.42

As Talbert goes on to note, the extent of our shared worlds and shared experiences with another person can make a difference to how well we know
that person.43 These depth and breadth requirements are met when people
come to share a world, that is, share a world not only in a “wide sense,”
where a person shares a world with many other people based on widely
shared characteristics, but also in a “narrow sense,” where a person shares
a world with another based on interactive, shared experiences. These interactive, shared experiences help generate a shared history and a body
of common knowledge, which enable each person to interpret the mental
states of the other person reliably. She cites the example of a couple who
share in an intense six-day romance; although such couples “often believe
that they know each other well,” she notes that they “are almost entirely
wrong.”44 A part of what is lacking from such a romance, Talbert argues,
is the lack of a shared world.
One way of construing Talbert’s depth and breadth requirements in
Lewis’s terms, then, is to focus on the shared world of the two people
who know each other. Whilst there is surely more to a shared world than
shared relationships, this seems to be a vital part of sharing worlds with
another person. When a couple meet each other’s families, for instance,
the depth and breadth of their second-personal knowledge of each other
will increase because they will see aspects of the other person brought
out by their family that they had not seen before. Not only will they learn
new things about each other, and new ways of engaging with each other,
but also, they will share more of their world with each other because they
will come to see aspects of their characters that were hidden before, or
dispositions that were dormant. This will no doubt make a difference to
the character of their attention sharing with each other, and subsequently,
increase the depth and breadth of their personal knowledge of one another. They will, in short, know each other better now that they have met
each other’s families.
Assuming this application of Lewis’s observation is correct, let us now
consider the implications for corporate worship. If a good way of knowing
another person well is to engage with them in a variety of contexts and
environments, so that we see more of them and build up a shared world
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 199.
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 199–200.
44
Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 200.
42
43
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together, and, if engaging with them with other people helps to do this,
then the same might be said of our coming to know God better: by engaging with God with other people, we have an opportunity to come to
know more of God and come to share more of his world, and so come
to know him better. Lewis makes this point himself, continuing from the
passage quoted above:
In this [possessing each friend not less but more as the number of those with
whom we share him increases], Friendship exhibits a glorious “nearness
by resemblance” to Heaven itself where the very multitude of the blessed
(which no [human] can number) increases the fruition which each has of
God. For every soul, seeing Him in her own way, doubtless communicates
that unique vision to all the rest. That, says an old author, is why the Seraphim in Isaiah’s vision are crying “Holy, Holy, Holy” to one another (Isaiah
6:3). The more we thus share the Heavenly Bread between us, the more we
shall have.45

If it is true that different people bring out different characteristics and aspects of a person, then we might think that by engaging in a community
of believers who are also engaging with God, we are able to see different
aspects of God than were available alone. Unless we are fundamentalists
about our own tradition or spirituality, most of us would admit that we
benefit from partaking in different kinds of worship. More formal, contemplative worship allows us to engage with God’s holiness and approach
God with awe, for instance. And more informal worship might allow us
to appreciate God’s closeness and the normality of God’s presence in the
everyday, for example. If this is the case for traditions, then surely it is the
case for individuals. If Lewis is right in thinking that only Ronald can bring
out a certain aspect of Charles, then we should think of corporate worship
as playing a similar role in the spiritual life. The same might be the case
on a smaller scale. Worshipping God alongside someone whom we know
to be overcome with guilt, for instance, will bring home aspects of God’s
grace and mercy. It is possible in such an experience that, in engaging with
someone who is engaging with God in a way radically different from our
own, we see aspects of God which were not available to us alone.46

Lewis, The Four Loves, 74.
However, whilst Lewis’s example is helpful, it might be objected that there are some
disanalogies between Lewis’s case and the case of corporate worship. In Lewis’s example,
the object of our experience (our friend) might be altered in a variety of different ways. For
instance, in experiencing a friend, Ronald, laugh at a particularly Caroline joke, that is, a
joke that Charles, also a friend, would have told or appreciated, we see a different aspect of
his character, thereby shaping our experience of him. However, we might also think that,
in seeing Charles react to Ronald’s laughing, we come to see something of our friend which
we had previously disregarded. In terms of corporate worship, the first possibility corresponds with a person experiencing God differently by engaging with others’ engagement
with God, and the second possibility corresponds with a person seeing a member of the
church respond to God and so bringing them to see something new about God. Now, while
the second possibility looks like it will occur more frequently in corporate worship, the first
could happen, too.
45
46
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Corporate Worship as Enabling Us to Perceive God Better
Assuming that God cannot deceive us, and, therefore, that condition (3) of
Talbert’s analysis (God has not deceived Paula about himself in important
respects) is fulfilled,47 let us turn to condition (4):
(4) Paula has succeeded in accurately perceiving what God has revealed—i.e., Paula’s judgement is not impaired by her own biases.
As we suggested, there are (at least) two ways of specifying the point of
Lewis’s example. The first, which we explored in the previous section focused on the fact that that the presence of others can have an instrumental
effect on our experience of God as the object of our attention and, thereby,
broaden and deepen our knowledge of God.
Now, we turn to consider the second possibility, that the presence of
others in corporate worship can have a causal impact on what we attend
to. That is, the presence of others can dictate how we experience our friend.
As we will suggest, one way of expanding this thought is by focusing on
our joint engagement with God in corporate worship.
Evelyn Underhill, an Anglo-Catholic spiritual writer of the first half of
the twentieth century, writes, “Christian worship is never a solitary undertaking” because worship is part of a tradition forged in community, a
tradition that stretches back to when Christ himself taught us to pray beginning with “Our Father.”48 And so “the worshipping life the Christian,”
according to Underhill, “whilst profoundly personal, is essentially that of
Consider, for instance, participating in corporate worship alongside a friend whom you
know has been suffering from chronic pain. Suppose you are aware of God’s presence and
are sharing attention with him throughout the liturgy, whilst also being aware of your friend.
After receiving communion, you notice that something has changed in your friend—his
shoulders are lifted, his eyes are brighter, and he manages a contented smile to you across
the pew. As you become aware of this, you suddenly come to the realisation that God has
brought some kind of healing to your friend. In seeing God’s interaction with your friend
(albeit in an indirect way), corporate worship has allowed you not only to see your friend’s
perception of God, but in some way, you see more of God as an object. Your knowledge of
God as a person has been deepened and broadened by such an experience.
We might still think that the point is still too general to explain the specific value of
corporate worship, at least as we have explained it so far. More specifically, on the account
considered so far, a person’s experience of other members of the congregation plays a purely
instrumental role; thus, just as our experience of other congregants might shape our experience, so too might the comfortableness of the pew, the weather, the choice of altar flowers
and one’s mood and emotions. Those who are not present might have a similar effect on our
worship. Seeing an empty chair where a friend used to sit or walking past someone asking
for money on the street on the way to Church might also alter our experience of God. Since
we do not think, however, that corporate worship is the only thing which can broaden and
deepen our knowledge of God, nor do we think the epistemic value of corporate worship is
the only value, this does not seem too problematic.
47
It is important to clarify (as an anonymous referee has suggested to us) that whilst it is
not possible for God to deceive us, this does not mean that it is impossible to be deceived
about God. Yet, the question of whether we can be deceived about God relates more directly
to condition (4), which focuses on our misperception of God, and so we will consider this
objection later in the section.
48
Underhill, Worship, 81.

Faith and Philosophy

316

a person who is also a member of a group.”49 Consequently, she maintains,
“The Christian as such cannot fulfil his spiritual obligations in solitude.”50
Furthermore, she argues,
No one soul—not even the greatest saint—can fully apprehend all that this
has to reveal and demand of us, or perfectly achieve this balanced richness
of response. That response must be the work of the whole Church; within
which souls in their infinite variety each play a part, and give that part to the
total life of the Body.51

Here we can see that it is not merely that others in the congregation colour our own experience of God, but, rather, our experience of God, and,
thereby, our knowledge of God, is bound up in our relation to the Church.
As Underhill describes, liturgical worship requires a kind of “joint action”
of the “Christian group.”52 In light of Underhill’s theology of the Church,
one of the implications of taking corporate worship to be a collective act
is that we must consider not only the relationship between an individual
congregant and God, but also the relationship between each of the congregants. Consequently, worship should not be taken to be a facilitation
of many individual engagements with God which are enhanced by the
environment of the Church, but, rather, as Underhill emphasises, worship
is importantly social, where there is a collective engagement with God in
and through the Church.
To further explore this understanding of worship as a social phenomenon, we turn to considering worship as an opportunity for mutual object
(that is, God) perception, and we begin by noting that, whilst liturgical
worship might allow us to share attention with God, this is not the only
kind of shared attention which takes place in worship. Worship also involves sharing attention with other members of the congregation. Indeed,
many points in liturgy seek to draw our attention not only to the presence
of God, but also to our fellow worshippers. Take the opening of one of the
Eucharistic prayers from the Church of England’s Common Worship, for
instance:
The Lord is here.
All His Spirit is with us.
Lift up your hearts.
All We lift them up unto the Lord.
It is right to give praise to the Lord our God
All It is right to give thanks and praise.53
Underhill, Worship, 83.
Underhill, Worship, 83.
51
Underhill, Worship, 85.
52
Underhill, Worship, 99.
53
Common Worship, Holy Communion.
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Whilst this dialogue seeks to make the congregation aware that God is
present in their worship, there is also a sense in which the congregation
must be aware of one another in grasping the meaning of the statement,
“His Spirit is with us.” That is, the individual congregant is not only made
aware of God’s presence, but also, God’s presence acts as the object of a
kind of mutual attention sharing between congregants. Let us expand this
observation more precisely.
First, it is important to note that, whilst discussions of shared attention often focus on attention sharing between two persons, this does not
preclude the possibility of much wider groups of people, say, a Church
congregation, from engaging in joint, or shared, attention. As John
Campbell notes, “Joint attention requires an object to which to attend
and two or more people to attend to it. In principle there seems to be no
limit to the number of people who could be jointly attending to the same
object.”54 Secondly, whilst there is there is no consensus on the nature of
joint attention,55 certain views of joint attention lend themselves better to
our consideration of jointly attending to God in liturgical worship. More
specifically, the relational view defended by Axel Seemann and John
Campbell will lend itself well to our present discussion.56
As Campbell outlines the relational view,
[J]oint attention is a primitive phenomenon of consciousness. Just as the object you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can be a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending
to the object. This is not to say that in a case of joint attention, the other
person will be an object of your attention. On the contrary, it is only the object that you are attending to. It is rather, that, when there is another person
with whom you are jointly attending to the thing, the existence of that other
person enters into the individuation of your experience. The other person
is there, as co-attender, in the periphery of your experience. The object attended to, and the other person with whom you are jointly attending to that
object, will enter into your experience in quite different ways.57

On the relational view of joint attention, attending to an object in the
presence of another person alters the kind of experience one has. Or, as
Campbell puts it,
[T]he individual experiential state you are in, when you and another are
jointly attending to something, is an experiential state that you could not be
in were it not for the other person attending to the object. The other person
enters into your experience as a constituent of it, as co-attender, and the
other person could not play that role in your experience except by being
co-attender.58
Campbell, “Joint Attention,” 287.
Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 183.
56
Seemann, “Joint Attention”; Campbell, “Joint Attention.”
57
Campbell, “Joint Attention,” 288.
58
Campbell, “Joint Attention,” 289.
54
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Thus, to take an example from Seemann, when you are driving with a
passenger, “his focus of attention will have a particular kind of impact on
yours”;59 when he looks in a certain direction at the road, “your focus of
attention will quite automatically realign with his.”60 What is remarkable
about this, as Seemann notes, is that, “although the other person is not
what you are look at . . . her focus plays this controlling role” in the focus
of your attention.61 Mutual awareness, as Seemann notes, requires “each
involved creature to be causally sensitive to the thing in his or her own
focus of attention and behaviour, and second, for each creature to be casually sensitive in this way to the other’s focus of attention and behavior.”62
Yet, to play this experience-shaping role, there must be some means
of communication between those who are jointly attending to an object.
Seemann notes that, “when we are jointly looking at an object, we are
usually able to (and often do) point out the object of our attention to each
other. We can direct each other’s focus to particular aspects of the scene
we are considering.”63 As Melinda Carpenter and Kristen Liebal note, this
communication between perceivers might occur via some kind of verbal
communication, for example, “Isn’t that great?!,”64 or perhaps, some form
of non-verbal communication, “just a meaningful, expressive look,”65 for
instance.
The important point for our purposes, then, is that, if the relational view
of joint attention is right, there is a structural difference in cases of mutual
object-focusing and individual object-focusing. The co-attender structures
and guides your perception of the object in important ways. This gives us
the resources to begin to explain the thought behind Lewis’s friendship
example. One of the things that is lacking after the death of Charles is not
only Charles’s ability to alter instrumentally Ronald’s perception of all his
other friends, but also his role in sharing attention with Ronald to jointly
perceive objects in the world. Just as the experience of the road as an object of joint attention between car passengers involves being related to the
other perceiver, A’s perception of B as an object of joint attention involves
a certain relation between A and B. If Seemann is right, then A and C can
actively shape one another’s perception of B as an object of their attention.
As Seemann puts it, individuals who engage in jointly attending to some
object are “not only perceivers but also agents who shape the experiences
of those others with whom they attend to objects in their environment.”66

Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 184.
Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 184.
61
Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 184.
62
Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 199.
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Seemann, “Reminiscing Together,” 7.
64
Carpenter and Liebal, “Joint Attention, Communication,” 167.
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Carpenter and Liebal, “Joint Attention, Communication,” 167.
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Seemann, “Reminiscing Together,” 7.
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The implications for corporate worship should now be obvious. Whilst
it might be true that your environment can shape your perception, only
those who are jointly perceiving can act in the agential way that Seemann
describes. And, thus, only those who are present in worship and engaging
in mutual object-focusing can take this active role in shaping your perception. In this understanding of corporate worship, it is not that the
congregants serve to enhance one another’s personal experiences of God,
but rather, the congregants mutually guide one another’s experience of
God, shaping one another’s focuses of attention through their interactions
(whether verbal or non-verbal) through the liturgy. Whilst it is possible
for such attention guiding merely to enhance each individual’s experience
of God in the liturgy (such as in the instrumental way described at the
end of the previous section), there is a way of resisting such a description
here. As Carpenter and Liebal note, in triadically sharing attention with
another person and mutually focusing on some object, it is possible to
gain a kind of mutual perceptual knowledge.67 On their account of mutual
knowledge, it is not merely that the presence of the other person shapes
your own experience and, thereby, your own knowledge, but rather, they
note, if attention is shared on some object and there is communication
between the two perceivers, then they mutually know something about
the object of their shared attention.
Such an analysis provides an interesting way of thinking about the essentially joint actions of Christian liturgy which Underhill describes. Take
the line of liturgy cited above, for example. In reciting the words, “The
Lord is here. His Spirit is with us,” the script prompts a kind of mutual
object-focusing on the presence of God through the use of verbal communication. That is, the congregant is made aware, by the script, not only
of an object of perception (the presence of God), but also of their fellow
perceivers (the rest of the congregation). This is one way of understanding
what Underhill means when she states that “joint action is impossible
without an agreed pattern, a liturgy; even though this pattern be of the
simplest kind.”68
Carpenter and Liebal, “Joint Attention, Communication,” 167.
Underhill, Worship, 99. It might seem to some that, rather than focusing on God, the
primary focus of attention sharing in the liturgy is the object of the priest and the liturgical
script. Wolterstorff puts this point succinctly:
To whom are the people listening? To the minister, obviously the celebrant, the
leader, the readers, the musicians. But is that all? In the Episcopal liturgy, at the
conclusion of the first and second readings from Scripture, the reader says “This
is the Word of the Lord.” . . . Said or assumed in each of these cases is that the
people have been listening not just to the speaker but to what God said or says.
(Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 63–64)
While it is true that the direct object of shared attention is the script and the celebrant, it is
by means of this object that the congregation can mutually focus on God. In listening to a
sermon, as Søren Kierkegaard describes it, the role of the listener is not to pay attention only
to the words of the preacher, but rather, the “listener during the speech has the task of paying
attention to how he is hearing, whether through the discourse he within himself is secretly
speaking with God” (Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses, 125).
67
68

320

Faith and Philosophy

How does the above account relate to Talbert’s condition concerning
the accuracy of one’s perception? In allowing others to shape and guide
our perception of God in the worship in the way we have outlined, one
of the results is that our own biases and impairments can be corrected by
sharing attention with others. When alone, we might have the tendency
to focus on certain aspects of God’s character, and thereby build up a biased picture of God, in worship, it is possible to be guided by the focus of
another’s attention.69 This change in our focus might simply be by means
of the emphasis another person places on certain words, the shape and
posture of their body, or even the focus of their gaze (on, say, the altar, or
the cross, for example). All these ways might serve as pointers to redirect
our own attention and thereby to experience some different aspect of God,
thereby removing our biases in important ways.
We can appreciate this point when we consider our practice of reading
and interpreting Scripture, something we have discussed above, as a way
of sharing attention with God, and a typical activity in corporate worship.
Underlying that discussion is an assumption that when we read and interpret Scripture, we are doing it faithfully, for an unfaithful interpretation
will not reveal God to us but rather serve as a mirror for our own individual biases. Reading and interpreting Scripture in community serves as
a corrective to our biases and helps us come to perceive God better than
we would on our own. Hauerwas makes this point, in his characteristically provocative style:
No task is more important than for the Church to take the Bible out of the
hands of individual Christians in North America. Let us no longer give
the Bible to all children when they enter the third grade or whenever their
assumed rise to Christian maturity is marked, such as eighth-grade commencements. Let us rather tell them and their parents that they are possessed by habits far too corrupt for them to be encouraged to read the Bible
on their own.70

To argue for his point, Hauerwas maintains that reading and interpreting
the Bible faithfully requires spiritual and moral transformation, something
that happens in the Church, where people become Christians and learn to
read and interpret the Bible, not as answerable to “common sense,” but
rather to the authority of a truthful community constituted by the Eucharist.71 If Hauerwas is right, we can then readily see how corporate worship
69
As an anonymous referee helpfully points out—this kind of attention-shaping might
occur by means of the conscious collective actions of those present in the liturgy, but there
may also be some kind of collective consciousness present at a lower level. In the scientific
research on quorum sensing in animals and bacteria (see Waters and Bassler, “Quorum
Sensing,” for instance), it has been shown that some organisms communicate using chemical
signals which allow bacteria to monitor its environment and alter its behaviour. A similar
kind of communication might occur between humans in worship through a kind of subconscious responsivity to social cues which makes it possible for individuals to in some sense
perceive God together and guide one another’s attention.
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Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 15.
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Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 23.
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helps us to perceive God better than we otherwise would in individual
worship: for in our reading and interpreting Scripture, as done typically in
corporate worship, we learn how to read Scripture together, as a truthful
community constituted by the Eucharist, where our own readings are
informed not only by the readings of present members but also of past
members, especially of spiritual masters, and this then corrects the biases
inherent in our own readings that would lead us away from God rather
than into significant presence with God, as Green and Quan describe.
However, whilst Lewis’s example is helpful to explain how corporate
worship might allow for a broadening of a person’s knowledge of God
as well as providing a correction for our biases, there are some potential
shortcomings to corporate worship which this position also highlights.
First, it is important to acknowledge that our social interactions with another person can have a detrimental effect on our knowledge of a person,
as well as a positive effect. Certain social environments might cause a
friend to withdraw or bring out misleading aspects of their character. Furthermore, our attention might be misleadingly directed towards certain
aspects of our friend’s character which result in a strengthening of our
own biases, not a correcting. Similarly, just as corporate worship can allow
us to experience more of God and give God an opportunity to reveal more
aspects of himself, there might also be detrimental effects to corporate
worship. Some worship gatherings, for example, might emphasise only
God’s anger and entirely ignore his love, by, say, ignoring some passages
in Scripture. If corporate worship can alter our experience of God as an
object of our attention, then such a possibility must be admitted. Although
there is not space here to explore fully the epistemic costs of corporate
worship, it is important to recognise that corporate worship can misleadingly shape one’s experience of God. Indeed, in extreme cases, a person’s
experience of God in certain contexts can give rise to what Michelle Panchuk describes as “religious trauma” in which individuals wrongly feel
shame towards God, and often lose their faith.72
As we have now seen, there are at least two ways of thinking about the
phenomena involved in the kind of case Lewis suggests, both of which
have some application in outlining the epistemic value of corporate worship in allowing us to know God better than we might by engaging only
in individual worship. We first suggested that the corporate dimension of
worship might firstly dictate the breadth and depth of our experience, and
thereby our knowledge of God. We then claimed that corporate worship
might also play a causal role in our sharing attention with God, through
a kind of mutual object focusing. It is important to see that these two features of corporate worship, though connected, can come apart. We can
imagine, for instance, an evil neuroscientist having a causal influence on
our experience, whilst playing no role as an object of our experience. It
72
Panchuk, “The Shattered Self.” We expand this point, on the dark side of corporate
worship in Cockayne, Efird, and Warman, “Shattered Faith.”
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also seems possible that those who are objects of our experience, and able
to shape and colour our attention, might play little or no causal role in our
experience, if, say, we attend a social gathering in which everyone is staring
at their iPhones, disengaged from the goings on in the room. We have
argued that corporate worship can both colour the phenomenology of our
experience of God and also play a causal role in how we experience God.
We have also seen that these two concepts are often connected—many of
the examples we have given feature something of both phenomena—in
pointing our attention towards as aspect of God’s character for instance,
our fellow congregants might both shape the phenomenology of our experience of God, as well as playing a causal role in what we attend to.
This is particularly important when we consider how difficult it is for
us to be significantly present to God, that is, to put ourselves in a position
to experience God second-personally and to share attention with him. In
such a context, the importance of co-perceivers is all the more apparent.
Tanya Luhrmann makes this point vividly when she writes,
Human interaction—real human interaction, with two people together in
a room—is remarkably dense. We move, touch gesture mimic . . . we scan
people’s faces intently as we talk, and what we see in their faces affects what
we say. . . . But God has no face. You cannot look him in the eye and judge
that he hears you speak. He does not make the little phatic grunts we make
to each other on the phone, to show we’re still listening. Even when people
learn to pick mental events out of their mind that they attribute to God, it
can be difficult for them to shake their doubts without that more fibrous
quality of the human back-and-forth.73

As we have seen previously, without face-to-face interaction, shared
attention then becomes difficult with God, not only because of God’s
incorporeality but also because of our own sinful states of mind, being
typically disinterested in God and distracted from him. In such a state, we
need one another to help us come to know God, and to know him better,
second-personally.74
Conclusion
We have argued that an individual’s second-personal knowledge of God
is, in important ways, bound up in the community. To many theologians,
this will not be a surprising conclusion to have reached; Scripture places
an important emphasis to the community in relating rightly to God. Yet,
Luhrmann, When God Talks Back, 73.
An anonymous referee asks, “Can there be genuine interaction with God without the
worshipper feeling, for instance, forgiven by God or spoken to through the homily?” Our
answer is that there are surely many more ways of experiencing God in corporate worship
than we have space to explore in this paper. Our focus is narrow in scope to account for
instance of shared attention and personal presence in worship. Yet, as we have seen in section
one, there is more to knowing a person than just experiencing his or her presence. Our claim
is not that this is the only experience of God a worshipper could have during worship, nor
that this is the only benefit of corporate worship. To give an exhaustive account of corporate
experiences of God would far surpass what we have space to discuss in this paper.
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often in discussions of religious epistemology and religious experience,
this corporate dimension to our relationship with God is overlooked. In
this paper, we have shown how a focus on the community of faith can enrich and expand our discussions of knowing God and experiencing God.
Yet, there is still much more to be done. For instance, whilst our focus
has been on the importance of attention sharing in liturgical worship, we
know that many neuro-atypical individuals struggle to participate in this
kind of activity. And so, more needs to be said to provide a properly inclusive account of common worship.75 Moreover, whilst we have touched
on important issues relating to the shared experiences of worshippers, it
also seems that beliefs are in some way shared in the Church; “We believe
in God . . . ” begins the Nicene Creed, which is recited in the majority of
church liturgies weekly. But what does it mean for the Church to believe
in this way? Or what is the relationship between individual believers and
the gathered whole? The shared nature of the actions and beliefs of the
gathered Church, along with the question of just what metaphysical status
the gathered Church has, are questions which provide ample material for
important developments in the philosophy of worship and Church practice.76
University of St Andrews
University of York
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